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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the various potential impacts of Brexit on UK regions and outlines the sub-national governance
challenges these potential impacts raise. In the light of these, the types of activities that UK sub-national governance
bodies have initiated in preparation for Brexit are then reviewed. The conclusions suggest that the UK sub-national
institutional system is largely unprepared for the post-Brexit realities.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper highlights various critical emerging issues facing
UK and European Union (EU) regions in the context of
Brexit, issues which as yet are little articulated and under-
developed in current policy debates on either side of the
English Channel. In terms of regional issues, we will
argue that Brexit is likely to make the UK’s interregional
inequalities worse than they are, while at the same time
also inhibiting the sub-national governance devolution
agendas that the UK government itself advocates. These
conﬂicting pressures are to some extent also reﬂected in
ofﬁcial UK government documents in which the place-
based dimensions of government policy are only weakly
developed in comparison with sectoral interests that dom-
inate the picture, as is currently also the case in Brexit
debates. Most UK localities have no role whatsoever in
the Brexit negotiations and have received no real guidance
from central government, the result of which is that local
and regional authorities are currently largely on their own
in terms of thinking and planning for Brexit.
This paper surveys the types of actions and activities
that local, city and regional authorities within the UK are
undertaking in response to Brexit. On the basis of this sur-
vey, we reﬂect on the ability of different sub-national
bodies to design and implement local industrial and
development policies suitable for the post-Brexit context.
We also discuss some Brexit-related issues facing regions
in other EU countries and outline some of their major
concerns.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the relationships between Brexit, UK interregional
inequalities and current sub-national governance trends.
It then surveys the different actions and activities currently
being undertaken by different UK sub-national governance
tiers and bodies, and follows this with a short review of
some Brexit-related activities at the sub-national level
taking place in other EU member states. The paper then
reﬂects on the extent to which the current UK sub-national
governance institutional set-up is ﬁt for purpose in the
post-Brexit context, especially in comparison with other
European counterparts, and it identiﬁes the key themes
and principles that need to be embedded in any future
post-Brexit UK urban and regional policy framework.




A very powerful Leave narrative at the time of the UK
Referendum on EU Membership on 23 June 2016 was
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the idea that the ‘metropolitan elites’ of London were the
major beneﬁciaries of EU membership, while the majority
of the population did not beneﬁt from such membership.
Judging by the frequency with which this argument was
put forward by both politicians and the general public in
the pre-Referendum media coverage, it is clear that this
argument gained real traction in many arenas. Yet, while
this argument was very persuasive, it has been shown to
be entirely wrong empirically. This was ﬁrst demonstrated
by Los, McCann, Springford, and Thissen (2017a) who
showed that the UK regions that voted Leave tend to be
more dependent on EU markets for their prosperity than
those regions that voted Remain. This broad pattern
holds true both when calculated on the basis of local
gross domestic product (GDP) or local labour income
(Los et al., 2017a). Overall, there is a clear correlation
between greater local dependency on EU markets and the
share of the Leave vote, especially in the Leave-voting
regions of the Midlands and North of England which are
also amongst the UK’s economically weakest regions. Fur-
thermore, if we expand this analysis and consider all the
Brexit trade-related risk exposure of each UK region –
including all UK–EU global value-chains connected to
third countries – we see that this same broad pattern is
still very evident. The regions that voted Leave, and
especially the economically weaker regions, tend to be
more exposed to Brexit trade-related risks than the regions
that voted Remain. In contrast, the wealthier Remain-vot-
ing regions of the UK in and around the London economy
as well as in Scotland are both less dependent on EU mar-
kets for their prosperity and less exposed to wider Brexit
trade-related risks than the economically weaker Leave-
voting regions (Chen et al., 2018).
Obviously the actual regional and national outcomes of
Brexit on the UK and the EU will depend in part on the
ﬁnal form of Brexit. For most of the time since the 2016
Referendum the discussions have largely been about four
broad forms of Brexit, namely, the so-called Norway
model, the Swiss model, the Canada/South Korea model
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) model, with
most analyses assuming that the likely adverse economic
consequences of Brexit on the UK become progressively
more serious with this ordering. Meanwhile, the likely
regional impacts of these four main types of Brexit are all
discussed in detail by Los et al. (2017a). In addition, two
other possibilities have recently emerged in mainstream
public debates, namely, a hybrid ‘Chequers Plan’ model
proposed by Prime Minister Theresa May and a ‘No
Deal’ scenario. The Chequers Plan is something of a com-
bination between the so-called ‘Jersey model’ (Springford
& Lowe, 2018) and the Swiss model (Springford, 2017),
and this model aims to keep goods and agricultural com-
modities in a common UK–EU customs set-up while
excluding services. On face value, a simple sectoral view
would suggest that the likely impacts of the Chequers
Plan would appear to be less severe for regions specialized
in manufacturing than for more service-oriented regions.
Indeed, research arrives at similar conclusions, although
not speciﬁcally related to this plan (Dhingra, Machin, &
Overman, 2017; Fingleton, 2018). However, the high
levels of value-chain integration at the local level between
services and manufacturing (Los et al., 2017a) means that
such services versus manufacturing-type conclusions do
not necessarily hold. Meanwhile, the consequences of a
No Deal scenario are generally regarded as being cata-
strophic for the UK as a whole, and especially for many
of the UK’s weaker regions that tended to vote Leave
(The UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE), 2018), due in
particular to the rupturing of cross-border just-in-time
(JIT) supply chains in regions already deeply embedded
EU-wide value-chains (Bailey, McCann, & Ortega-
Argilés, 2018). Indeed, a large majority of other research
using different data sources and modelling techniques has
also subsequently come to similar ﬁndings that the likely
impacts of Brexit will more adversely affect the weaker
regions of the UK (Borchert & Tamberi, 2018a, 2018b;
Cambridge Econometrics, 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Clarke,
Serwicka, & Winters, 2017; Gasiorek, Serwicka, & Smith,
2018; House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee
(HoCEEUC), 2018; Institute for Public Policy Research
(IPPR), 2018; Levell & Norris Keiller, 2018; Los et al.,
2017a; Brewer & Quest, 2018; HM Government,
2018b), largely irrespective of the form of Brexit.
These adverse implications of Brexit for the UK’s
weaker regions are also likely to be exacerbated by the
fact that many of these regions have greatly beneﬁtted
from EU Cohesion Policy over more than four decades.
The EU Structural and Investment Funding Streams are
to be terminated post-Brexit. Annually, the EU Structural
and Investment Funds currently invest on average some
€2.5 billion in the UK, a ﬁgure that rises with domestic
co-ﬁnancing to over €4 billion, and to over €10 billion
per annum if we also include European Investment
Bank1 investments (Ayres & O’Brien, 2018).2 These
funds tend to be weighted somewhat more towards urban
areas, and especially urban areas in the UK’s weaker
regions. At the same time, if we also include the impli-
cations of the withdrawal of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) from rural areas, these ﬁgures then become
even more signiﬁcant because the UK’s allocation of
CAP funds currently amounts to over €3.2 billion per
annum. In addition, with Cohesion Policy, the funds allo-
cated to UK rural areas and maritime areas for promoting
economic development and structural transitions amount
to some €770 million, respectively, plus some €300 million
of domestic UK co-ﬁnancing, leading to an annual total
funding stream of over €1 billion for economic develop-
ment in UK rural and maritime areas (Ayres, & Brien,
2018). All these funding streams, which currently amount
to over €11 billion per annum, and over €14 billion per
annum if we include CAP, are to be terminated after
Brexit.
Brexit, therefore, has the potential to make the UK’s
interregional inequalities, which are already amongst the
highest in the industrialized world, to become much greater
than they already are. This is because Brexit is likely to
make the trading position of the UK’s weaker regions sig-
niﬁcantly harder that it already is, and therefore these
2 Chloe Billing et al.
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regions will have to restructure and adjust much more than
wealthier regions in order to maintain their competitiveness
and prosperity. Yet, these Leave-voting regions are also
those that tend to be less resilient to economic shocks
and also more reliant on EU regional, urban and rural
development funding streams. Their industrial structures
tend to be more specialized and narrowly deﬁned than
more prosperous regions, they display lower levels of tech-
nology and skills, their levels of global connectivity tend to
be much lower than in more prosperous regions, and their
governance autonomy and ﬂexibility also tends to be much
more limited than in many of the wealthier UK regions.
Indeed, this has already been very much the pattern of
UK regional responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
(Centre for Cities, 2018). In contrast, the UK’s more pros-
perous regions that voted Remain tend to be more resilient
to economic shocks because they are more globalized in
their trade orientation, more sectorally and structurally
diverse, with higher levels of knowledge activities, skills
and connectivity.
Yet, the fact that the UK’s peripheral and economically
weaker regions voted so strongly against their own econ-
omic interests to many observers appears puzzling. Part
of the reason could simply be that the ‘metropolitan elite’
argument was never seriously challenged during the EU
Referendum debates. Indeed, the only evidence on this
issue emerged a week or so before the vote took place
(Springford, Los, McCann, & Thissen, 2016). However,
more likely, the reason is that voting patterns depended
on a complex range of other issues, in which these critical
trade-related arguments were almost entirely lost (Los
et al., 2017a). Whatever the reason, it remains the case
that while all parts of the UK economy are likely to be
adversely affected by Brexit, the adverse effects will prob-
ably be much harsher in those economically weaker regions
with a more limited ability to adjust to the shocks. In all
likelihood, the result will be even greater interregional
imbalances within the UK than already exist.
The likely post-Brexit widening of the UK’s interregio-
nal imbalances must be a major cause of concern for poli-
tics. Dissatisfaction and disengagement from mainstream
politics is likely to worsen signiﬁcantly if Leave voters in
particular, who felt they were voting to improve their liveli-
hoods and the prosperity and viability of their local com-
munities, subsequently ﬁnd that in the post-Brexit
context their communities are even more adversely
impacted than in the pre-Brexit context. Before the Brexit
vote, the recent aim of central government has been to
develop more of a place-based approach to UK policy,
with an increasing emphasis on helping weaker regions to
reorient themselves towards new development trajectories
by providing more local decision-making powers (HM
Government, 2017b). However, Brexit appears to have
stalled or even reversed many of these decentralization
and devolution processes.
Brexit is nowadays dominating, and to a large extent
completely overwhelming, the vast majority of UK current
government thinking and activities. The scale of the Brexit
challenge facing the UK means that many other aspects of
governance have been largely put on hold while the Brexit
process continues (Bloomberg, 2018), and this situation is
likely to continue to prevail for several years into the future.
In such a complex and uncertain environment in which the
UK’s long-run ﬁscal balances are also likely to deteriorate
(Emmerson, Johnson, Mitchell, & Phillips, 2016), the
need to control and coordinate government activities natu-
rally leads central government to try to centralize and con-
trol ‘in-house’ all government activities and initiatives, as
far as possible. This tendency towards centralization and
control is all the stronger in a state such as the UK,
which is already highly centralized and extremely top-
down in terms of governance decision-making systems.
This is because, unlike in federal countries, there are few,
if any, countervailing institutions to resist or oppose these
centralization pressures, and this is especially the case in
England. In the devolved administrations of Scotland
andWales, there are efforts to acquire power that were pre-
viously the remit of European policies such as agriculture,
ﬁsheries, and urban and regional policy (Menon, 2018).
In England, however, except for a very few localized efforts
for Brexit-related exemptions,3 sub-national government
has almost no inﬂuence and plays almost no part in the
Brexit negotiations. The only possible exception here is
the effort to maintain some special post-Brexit status for
the ﬁnancial markets in The City of London.4 This effort
is very much the remit of central government, although it is
supported by heavy local lobbying as, unsurprisingly, the
impacts of any such deal would be felt primarily in London.
Ironically, for all the media proﬁle and political efforts
going into securing such an exemption, this sector only
has a relatively low level of risk exposure in comparison
with many other UK sectors (Los, Chen, McCann, &
Ortega-Argilés, 2017b).
In extreme political economy circumstances such as
Brexit, these centralization processes might not necessarily
be a problem per se. However, the problem is that these
centralizing Brexit-related governance pressures are taking
place at a time when the UK government is also explicitly
advocating movements towards greater sub-national gov-
ernance decentralization and devolution. This is a policy
agenda that began in earnest from 2013 onwards and the
cornerstones of the agenda were the city-region devolution
deals and the Northern Powerhouse programme (McCann,
2016). The momentum behind the devolution agenda
increased rapidly throughout the period 2013–16, but
then has largely stalled since the EU Referendum. The
combined authority (CA) mayoral elections that took
place in 2017 were based on policies that were already
developed before the EU Referendum, but since then
almost no new devolution-related policy initiatives have
taken place and few, if any, are currently on the horizon.
Moreover, the downgrading of the long-term expectations
for the UK’s public ﬁnances, in part as a result of Brexit
(Emmerson et al., 2016), and the continuing austerity pol-
icies, have meant that local government ﬁnances have been
heavily curtailed. At present, much of UK sub-national
government, and within England especially, has very few
resources, with little power and with very limited inﬂuence
Interregional inequalities and UK sub-national governance responses to Brexit 3
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over central government. Indeed, it is no surprise that the
morale of local council leaders regarding the likely impacts
of Brexit is at a low ebb (Helm, 2018), with pessimism the
highest in the Leave-voting regions outside of London and
the South East (New Local Government Network
(NLGN), 2018). Indeed, the present analyses give good
reasons why local council leaders in these regions ought
to be especially concerned. At the same time, the hiring
of new public ofﬁcials and civil servants is dominated by
the need to expand central government’s capabilities to
deal with Brexit. As such, the Brexit-induced governance
centralization processes go precisely against the decentrali-
zation and devolution agenda that was being encouraged by
the UK government over recent years.
From a medium- and long-term policy perspective, the
national government’s contradictory positions on Brexit
and sub-national governance militate against any real
clarity or effectiveness in policy-making. The possibilities
for genuinely structured, analytical and strategic thinking
about the future of UK regional and urban policy have
become very limited because such thinking is constantly
running up against conﬂicting or contradictory political
or operational pressures. On the one hand, government
centralization could be argued to be essential both for nego-
tiation control and also to be able to develop UK-wide
standardized policy-setting for the post-Brexit era. On
the other hand, the regional shocks that are likely to be
induced by Brexit ought to mean that now is a time requir-
ing serious advances in UK urban and regional policy devel-
opment. Yet, a current concern in many quarters is that
efforts at genuinely long-term and outcome-oriented policy
design are becoming dominated by Brexit-induced political
thinking driven by short-term political considerations, and
these concerns are not without substance. Indeed, it was
this type of short-term political thinking that in 2010
gave rise to the abolition of the English regional develop-
ment agencies (RDAs) and their replacement by local
enterprise partnerships (LEPs), a policy decision that
took place without any real serious or structured thinking
about the long-term implications of the abolition decision.
Today, there are still genuine concerns regarding the extent
to which the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ agenda is maintaining
its earlier momentum and doubts about the seriousness
with which central government currently takes pro-
grammes such as the Northern Powerhouse or the ‘Mid-
lands Engine’. This is all the more concerning because
these two programmes also include many of the Leave-vot-
ing areas that are so vulnerable to Brexit. Apart from some
limited policy initiatives in the area of planning and hous-
ing, central government’s momentum behind the sub-
national devolution agenda appears to have largely stalled
for the foreseeable future, except possibly in the arena of
industrial policy.
The possible new place-based dimensions of UK indus-
trial policy were ﬁrst discussed in detail in the Green Paper
entitled Building Our Industrial Strategy (HM Govern-
ment, 2017a). The Green Paper included discussions
about the need for new sub-national meso-level institutions
within the UK that are capable of designing and delivering
a devolved approach to industrial policy decisions at a more
local level. For urban and regional analysts, these ideas rep-
resented a very welcome step forward in thinking and
suggested a possible change of trajectory for sub-national
governance. However, following an extensive public con-
sultation, in the subsequent White Paper entitled Industrial
Strategy: Building a Britain Fit for the Future (HMGovern-
ment, 2017b), these ideas had been heavily watered down.
Discussions regarding possible new meso-institutions has
all but disappeared and instead the focus shifted to the
development of 38 local industrial strategies to be led either
by city-region mayors in the newly formed CAs, or by the
LEPs in other areas. In contrast to the earlier Green Paper,
the tone of the White Paper appears to have moved away
from place-based and sub-national institutional reform pri-
orities and much more towards ‘big science’ themes with
limited sub-national institutional implications. Evidence
of this shift from place-based to sectoral narrative comes
from the fact that, in simple raw terms, the share of discus-
sion and analysis of place-based perspectives and dimen-
sions fell from just under 15% in the Green Paper to less
than 10%. To what extent is this shift due to pressure
and lobbying from strong sectoral interests or to a lack of
clarity on the part of city-regions regarding their future
post-Brexit roles and missions is not clear. There have
recently been new devolution arrangements agreed for the
North of the Tyne and Shefﬁeld City regions, and there
are some ongoing discussions about devolution-related
matters.5 The government 2017 election manifesto also
proposed a devolution framework, although nothing con-
crete has as yet emerged. A new UK Shared Prosperity
Fund to replace EU Cohesion Policy in the UK has been
announced, but there is little or no real detail as yet about
what this implies in terms of the overall UK sub-state gov-
ernance or ﬁnancial system, how this will relate to the UK’s
complex patchwork of local development institutional
arrangements or how this might operate alongside local
industrial strategies. There have been suggestions that
this will probably be a competitive fund, along the lines
of an expanded version of England’s Regional Growth
Fund,6 but whether such a system would best be operated
at the level of the UK as a whole, at the level of the four
nations or at a sub-state regional level remains a key issue
on which there has a yet been no theoretical, empirical or
operational discussions. Nor is it clear whether the British
Business Bank can replace the role of the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) or whether some form of regional
business or investment banks may be required.
Overall, it therefore remains to be seen what will
emerge from these various debates, but the general point
still holds that the sub-national decentralization and devo-
lution agenda which was already in train before the EU
Referendum appears to have largely stalled, while at the
same time Brexit now provides four serious challenges to
the long-run development potential of the UK’s weaker
regions. First, almost all the available evidence suggests
that the UK’s interregional inequalities are likely to increase
precisely because of Brexit and this leads ﬁrst to an economic
challenge of trying to reduce these inequalities or to limit
4 Chloe Billing et al.
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their growth in the long run. Second, Brexit leads to a pol-
itical challenge regarding the responses to public expec-
tations because this is not what Leave-voting regions
were led to believe in the EU Referendum debates. On
the contrary, many sections of the general public in econ-
omically weaker regions were persuaded that Brexit
would improve their local prosperity and fortunes. Third,
Brexit has created an enormous governance challenge
because the hyper-centralization induced by the Brexit
negotiation process has stalled and in many ways reversed
the earlier governance decentralization and devolution
trends evident before the EU Referendum. Fourth, there
is now a serious institutional challenge because while there
has been some progress in governance (Department for
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), 2017;
HM Government, 2018a), many LEPs still have no real
capacity to design or deliver serious long-term and effective
local industrial policies, especially in the weaker regions and
in the aftermath of Brexit. These four challenges ought to
prompt a nationwide rethinking about what the optimal or
appropriate scale of sub-national governance in England, at
least, might be (McCann, 2016). However, as we have
already seen, central government has as yet taken no real
steps to respond to any of these four challenges. The
responsibility for addressing these issues has therefore
shifted to local and regional sub-national or sub-state
bodies with very limited powers and no real potential to
inﬂuence national debates (Menon, 2018). It is many of
these institutions that are the most acutely aware of the
implications of Brexit for their communities and also the
most concerned to start addressing the challenges and we
survey in this paper the types of activities and actions cur-
rently evident at the sub-national and sub-state levels.
A SURVEY OF BREXIT ACTIONS AND
INITIATIVES WITHIN THE UK AND EUROPE
We conducted a UK-wide survey of Brexit-related policy
actions and initiatives using systematic search tools. The
survey involved a rapid evidence review of the academic lit-
erature, grey literature, online news and websites of relevant
government and business organizations between Septem-
ber 2017 andMay 2018. These examples were documented
and grouped according to the region and stakeholders
involved, highlighting the regional differences. In May
2018, we also hosted a series of participatory workshops
to explore post-Brexit scenarios with city, regional and
national stakeholders. The four workshops took place
across the country in London, Birmingham, Leeds and
Edinburgh and invited leading academics, policy stake-
holders, government ofﬁcers and business representatives
to participate in a series of panel discussions. Over 200 del-
egates attended the four workshops, which provided a use-
ful platform to ‘road test’ the ﬁndings from our rapid
evidence review on interregional inequalities and sub-
national responses.
In our evidence review, we did not restrict the analysis
to any particular size, mode or tier of sub-national govern-
ance because the institutional set-up of the UK is very
much a patchwork. Instead, we have documented at the
level of the 12 NUTS-1/OECD-TL2 UK regions all the
major publicized and observable activities, initiatives and
actions according to whether they were initiated: (1) at
the level of the wider city-region combined mayoral auth-
orities; (2) at the narrower level of the individual town or
city; (3) at the local level and initiated by businesses group-
ings, sectoral bodies or industry associations; and (4)
reports and analyses produced by other bodies. The
examples reported here reﬂect some of the key concrete
initiatives taking place in each region, and a fuller list of
activities including news brieﬁngs, political statements
and media pieces is available on our project website.7
As shown in Table 1, there are currently many different
types of Brexit-response activities and actions taking place
in the different parts of the UK. These activities and actions
are almost entirely organized at the local, city or city-
regional or devolved administration level with no involve-
ment from central government whatsoever. Indeed, central
government has as yet not organized any Brexit-response
activities or actions for sub-national government. Table 1
provides an overview of the various types of Brexit-response
activities and actions taking place within the UK sub-
national institutional set-up, broken down according to
the region, the tiers of governance, the types of stakeholders
and the types of initiatives. The list is obviously not exhaus-
tive, although it is detailed, and presents a broad roadmap
of what is or is not taking place.8
The ﬁrst thing that is immediately evident is that the
Brexit-response activities and actions currently taking
place in the different tiers and parts of the UK vary enor-
mously. In general, there is no systematic or coherent
schema underpinning these activities, most of which are
organized locally and largely in a rather ad-hoc manner.
Nor is there any real evidence of coordination between
regions, especially at the larger scale regions. Various dis-
cussion-type forums have been established and in different
localities aimed at bringing local stakeholders together;
some localities have held conferences to debate local
Brexit-related issues; and some areas have commissioned
local impact analyses and reports to improve the local evi-
dence base around key sectors. Some areas have also started
local campaigns aimed at raising Brexit awareness,
especially amongst the local business community, while
other regions are producing brieﬁng and discussion papers.
In general, the devolved administrations of Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland, along with some of the
major city-regions such as Greater Manchester and
the West Midlands, have undertaken the majority of the
Brexit-response activities. In contrast, when surveying the
UK sub-national governance landscape, it becomes evident
that the majority of UK localities have undertaken no
Brexit-response activities or actions whatsoever. Indeed,
even including the devolved administrations and the
CAs, while there have been various Brexit-response activi-
ties, across the UK there have been few if any concrete pol-
icy-related actions. At this stage, much of what is being
undertaken is largely speculative. In part this is because
the ﬁnal post-Brexit UK–EU trading relationships are
Interregional inequalities and UK sub-national governance responses to Brexit 5
REGIONAL STUDIES
Table 1. Brexit policy responses and actions taking place at the UK sub-national level.
Region Mayor/regional governance action City council actions Local businesses actions Reports, groups and commissions
West
Midlands
In August 2017, UK Cabinet ministers visited
the West Midlands to meet businesses and
members of the public in a Brexit Summit
Andy Street, Mayor of the West Midlands
Combined Authority (CA), demands greater
local governance powers: ‘Give us the millions
you hand the EU, demands
mayor’ (Birmingham Post, 2018)
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Robin
Walker attended a series of roundtables
hosted by Street
Birmingham
Birmingham City Council has an 11-
person team in charge of Brexit issues as
part of the European & International
Affairs team
Meetings were held to discuss the
council’s Business Growth Strategy within
the context of funding opportunities
available to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in a post-Brexit world
Stoke-on-Trent
In November 2017, the Stoke-on-Trent
and Staffordshire local enterprise
partnership (LEP) launched a survey to
seek the views of local businesses on
Brexit
The Engineering Employers’ Federation
(EEF – the manufacturers’ organization)
launched a Brexit Roadshow series
conference in Birmingham
The West Midlands National Farmers
Union and Daniel Dalton MEP invited
Shropshire Young Farmers to a one-day
conference on The Future of Farming in
Post-Brexit Britain in Worcester, 3
February 2018
A Birmingham City University think-
tank at the Institute for Design and
Economic Acceleration (IDEA) (2017)
produced a paper The Countdown to
Brexit
The West Midlands Economic Forum,
the Black Country Chambers of
Commerce and the Centre for Brexit
Studies produced the report Making a
Success of Brexit: Evaluating the
Impact on the Economy of the WMCA
and the Wider Region (Centre for Brexit
Studies, 2018)
Independent Brexit Impact Analysis by
the Brexit Advisory Board
Wolverhampton
The city held a meeting in January 2017
between local councillors and the LEP to
discuss the key Brexit issues for the city
Hereford
A ‘Brexit & Beyond’ conference was held
on 3 February 2018 near Coventry
‘Brexit Advisory Board’ – An advisory commission is constituted by members of the
Birmingham City Council, LEPs and the West Midlands CA as well as experts from the
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North East Advancing the North East event (November
2017): brought together a panel of experts to
develop a new agenda for change
North East Local Enterprise Partnership Board
engaged in discussions with local ﬁrms
Newcastle upon Tyne
The city hosted a Brexit and the North of
England: An Expert Seminar, funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC)
In March 2017, Newcastle College hosted
a conference of business leaders, learning
providers and other key stakeholders on
the economic outlook for Newcastle and
what steps the city could take to ensure
growth and jobs creation in the post-
Brexit context
The Brexit Ready Supply Chain
Campaign to Support North East
Businesses, which is jointly organized by
the North East England Chamber of
Commerce and commercial law ﬁrm
Square One Law, aims to create a
planned and collaborative approach to
Brexit preparations
The North East Brexit Group brings
together key networks representing
businesses, education, trade unions,
local authorities and voluntary
organizations
Sunderland:
Although Nissan is the major local
employer, Brexit is not covered in
Sunderland’s Core Strategy and
Development Plan 2017–2033 – other
than it provides a post-EU Referendum
perspective on future economic growth
forecasts
PACEC Ltd, in partnership with Dr Swati
Dhingra of the London School of
Economics’ (LSE) Centre for Economic
Performance, were commissioned by
Sunderland’s Economic Leadership Board
in March 2016 to study the likely
economic impacts of the UK voting to
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Durham
The EU Energy and Environment Sub-
committee published its report on Brexit:
Energy Security, looking at the
implications for energy supply, consumer
costs and decarbonization (Parliament.uk,
2018). The Durham Energy Institute
(Durham University) was quoted several
times in the report on questions related to
energy security, the internal energy
market, research collaboration, policy
uncertainty and Euratom
North West The North West Brexit Monitor, produced by
the Greater Manchester CA, documents key
economic and policy developments (Greater
Manchester Combined Authority, 2017)
Manchester
The Greater Manchester Brexit Monitor
(New Economy, 2016–18) is produced
monthly by New Economy, the strategy
research arm of the Association of Greater
Manchester CA, to provide a real-time
snapshot of the economic and policy
impact of Brexit
Andy Burnham, Mayor of the Greater
Manchester CA, argued for Greater
Manchester to have a say in negotiations
over Britain’s departure alongside the
devolved administrations of Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland
The bi-annual North West Business
Monitor, compiled by the Liverpool
Business Association (2018) and
Manchester-based independent market
research consultancy Lookout, provides
insights into a wide range of issues
facing the business owners and senior
managers of hundreds of North West
enterprises, including Brexit
Research from professional services
giant KPMG found that 33% of the
region’s manufacturers are thinking of
relocating part of their business
overseas in the next three years either to
boost productivity or to cut costs
The IPPR North (2017a) State of the
North Report 2017: The Millennial
Powerhouse contains a section on
‘Brexit: An Uncertain Future Ahead’.
The IPPR North (2017b) also produced
The Impact of Brexit on Energy in the
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Liverpool
In July 2017, a meeting of the Liverpool
City Region CA recognized that, alongside
local industrial strategies and greater
ﬁscal autonomy, there was also a need for
a regional voice on Brexit
Research was undertaken by the
Voluntary, Community, Faith and Social
Enterprise (VCFSE) on the potential
impact of Brexit on the Liverpool City





The leaders of three Yorkshire councils shared
a platform to argue that a Yorkshire-wide
devolution settlement would enhance the
scale and inﬂuence of the region including in
Brexit debates (26 January, 2018)
Leeds
Leeds City Council leader Judith Blake led
a delegation of core city mayors to meet
Michel Barnier to discuss the interests of
the city-regions
Shefﬁeld
A report was published by Oxford
Economics (2017) for the Shefﬁeld City
Region: The Impact of Brexit on the
Shefﬁeld City Region: Issues and Evidence
The Engineering Employers’ Federation
(EEF) (2017) EEF/BDO Regional Outlook
2017 report highlights how Brexit has
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Scotland The Scottish government produced a report
entitled the Potential Implications of the UK
leaving the EU (Gov.scot., 2016) and another
called Brexit: What’s at Stake for Businesses
(Gov.scot., 2017)
The Scottish Parliament Information Centre
has released a series of brieﬁng papers on
Brexit-related issues, and the Scottish
Government Culture, Tourism, Europe and
External Relations Committee (2017)
produced Brexit – What Scotland Thinks:
Summary of Evidence and Emerging Issues
documenting the views of over 150 different
organizations and individuals
Glasgow
The Glasgow Chambers of Commerce in
conjunction with the International Public
Policy Institute (IPPI) and The Fraser of
Allander Institute, University of
Strathclyde, produced a report entitled
Brexit and the Glasgow Economy:
Impacts, Actions and Asks (Glasgow
Chambers of Commerce, 2016)
Edinburgh
Edinburgh Council is to publish a plan on
how the local authority will support EU
citizens during the uncertainty of the
Brexit process
Dundee
Dundee has set up a Brexit Advisory Team,
made up of six of the council’s most senior
ofﬁcials, to monitor Brexit developments
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Inverness
The ‘Unheard Voices, Unseen
Communities’ event brought together
over 35 politicians, academics, social
workers and community activists to
discuss issues affecting Polish
communities in Scotland
On the 9 October 2017, the Civil Society
Brexit Project presented Brexit Means
What?
Perth
The Perth & Kinross Economic Journal
(2017) produced a brieﬁng on Migration
since the Brexit vote
London The mayor commissioned an independent economic Brexit analysis for London entitled
Preparing for Brexit (Cambridge Econometrics, 2018)
The Think Tank Centre for London (2017) produced the report London after Brexit
The City of London Corporation that has
been heavily involved in ensuring the
voice of ﬁnancial and professional
services ﬁrms is heard in helping to
shape the future relationship between
the UK and the EU
The real estate company Savills (2016)
produced the report The impact on
residential development: Brexit
Brieﬁng 2016
Frontier Economics (2018) produced the
report Assessing the Impact of Brexit on
Financial Services
Oliver Wyman (2017) produced the
report One Year On from the Brexit
Vote: A Brieﬁng for Wholesale Banks
The ILC 2018 report Brexit and the
Future of Migrants in the Social Care
Workforce (ILC-UK, 2018)
ECONSTOR (2016) produced a report
Will Brexit Dwarf London’s
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Wales In January 2017, the Welsh government
launched a White Paper Securing Wales’
Future (Gov.wales., 2017), setting out the
main issues facing Wales as the UK leaves the
EU
In February 2018, a document released by the
National Assembly for Wales, External Affairs
and Additional Legislation Committee is
entitled How is the Welsh Government
preparing for Brexit?
On 8 January 2018, The Welsh
government announced that a £50
million EU Transition Fund was being set
up to help Welsh businesses prepare for
Brexit
The Federation of Small Business (2018)
produced the report Making Brexit
Work for Wales’ Smaller Businesses
Cardiff University – The Wales and the
EU Hub (http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/
eu/) provides analyses examining the





Meeting of the Health and Wellbeing
Board, 3 April 2017 (Item 67). The board
discussed the possible impact of Brexit on
the local NHS and care workforce
Over 200 delegates from across the East
Midlands attended the region’s Brexit
conference entitled Business after Brexit
in November 2017 held at Newark
Showground
Uniteunion shopstewards fromacrossall
sectors of the East Midlands economy
came together on 28 November 2017 to
discuss Brexit and build an action plan to
protect jobs in the region
Northampton
The University of Northampton Students’
Union Rotaract Club and the
Northamptonshire County Council
together organized two events examining
the impacts of Brexit on jobs and
prosperity, the second of which was
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SouthWest An online survey to gather evidence about the
impact of Brexit was promoted by the Heart
of the South West LEP and local authority
partners in Devon, Plymouth, Somerset and
Torbay
Bristol
Mayor Marvin Rees convened a city-wide
Brexit Response Group (BRG) to fully
understand the challenges and
opportunities posed by Brexit. The group
includes local organizations in the public,
private, business and academic sectors
plus voluntary and community groups
Exeter
In October 2017, Exeter held its ﬁrst
international trade event aimed at local
businesses that export their goods or
services overseas, including speakers from
the Heart of the South West LEP and the
Department for International Trade
In March 2018, the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT)
brought together automotive
manufacturers, suppliers and
government ofﬁcials from across the
South West at its Regional Forum in
Swindon to discuss new supply chain
opportunities and preparations for
Brexit
The Chartered Institution of Building
Services Engineers (CIBSE) South-West
held a joint event on Brexit and the
impact on the South West construction
industry, attended by over 100 people
Cumulus Consultants (2017) produced
an analysis on the potential impacts of
Brexit for farmers and farmland wildlife
Plymouth
Plymouth established a Brexit
Opportunities and Resilience Group
update – Plymouth City Council provided
some research and analysis support for
the group – and its ﬁrst projects will be to
look at the issues and opportunities
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Truro
On 27 February 2017, representatives of
local councils, business leaders, health,
housing and education providers, and
voluntary and community organizations
discussed the progress in delivering the
Devolution Deal awarded to Cornwall and
the Isles of Scilly the previous year and to
hear about the area’s post-Brexit plans for
the future
South East The South East LEP (2017) published A ﬁve
year skills strategy: Brexit and its impact on
funding, sectors and the local workforce,
focusing on Brexit and its impact on funding,
sectors and the local workforce
The South East England Councils and South
East Strategic Partnership for Migration
produced a response to the Migration
Advisory Committee’s (MAC) call for evidence
on the economic and social impacts of the UK
exit from the EU
Oxford
Oxford City Council (2017) produced a
Response to a Local Government
Association Enquiry into the Impacts of
Brexit
In July 2017, the (Centre for European
Studies at Canterbury Christ Church
University (2017) produced the report
Kent andMedway. Making a Success of
Brexit: A Sectoral Appraisal of Small
and Medium Sized Enterprises and the
Rural Economy
Metro Dynamics produced a report on
the potential implications of Brexit on




In March 2018, the 11 local authorities that
comprise the Ireland/Northern Ireland Border
Corridor met with Helen McEntee, Republic of
Ireland Minister of State for European Affairs,
in Newry to discuss the implications of Brexit
on the Border Corridor
Armagh
In December 2017, the House of
Commons Brexit Committee was in
Northern Ireland to hear the views of local
people
Belfast
Belfast City Council established a
committee focusing on issues
surrounding Brexit
The Northern Ireland Chamber of
Commerce (2017) produced a report on
Business Brexit Priorities
PwC (2018) produced a report on
Brexit: Implications for Pharma and Life
Sciences Companies
Queen’s on Brexit brings together
academics from Queen’s University
Belfast to discuss Northern Ireland’s life
and policy affected by Brexit
The Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission (NIHRC) and The Northern
Ireland Business and Human Rights
Forum meet to discuss the steps
Northern Ireland businesses are taking
















not known, and partly because the evidence base that is
available to local policy-makers has been so limited. Nor
has there been any support from UK central government
which as yet has not organized any Brexit-response actions
or activities for sub-national tiers of government. Aware-
ness even at the local level of most of these Brexit-related
activities appears to be minimal at best, and at the level
of central government it is almost non-existent. Nor do
these local activities appear to have any inﬂuence on any
of the narratives and debates taking place in the highly
London-centric national media. Indeed, the limited, unco-
ordinated and largely ad-hoc nature of the local activities,
their largely undeﬁned roles and objectives, and their
almost total lack of inﬂuence on the national Brexit agenda
is in many ways a reﬂection of the overall state of UK sub-
national governance.
If we now consider the Brexit-related issues and
implications for regions in other EU member states, we
know that it is the regions in Ireland, Germany, the
Netherlands and Belgium, in descending order respect-
ively, that are the next most exposed regions to Brexit-
related risks (Chen et al., 2018). Except for Ireland,
the levels of Brexit trade-related risk exposure in these
countries are very much lower than those for the UK
regions, while regions in the rest of Europe spanning
the Mediterranean, Central Europe and the Nordic
countries have only tiny Brexit trade-related risk
exposure levels (Chen et al., 2018). However, there are
still serious concerns in many speciﬁc regions, and
especially those with longstanding trading relationships
with the UK such as regions in Ireland (Morgenroth,
2018) and regions close to the English Channel about
the likely impacts of Brexit on their future development
potential (European Union Committee of the Regions
(CoR), 2018a, 2018b). Given its high levels of Brexit
exposure (Chen et al., 2018), the Republic of Ireland
has developed tools to help ﬁrms assess their Brexit
risk exposure levels9 and some local councils in Ireland
have set up emergency funding possibilities for ﬁrms
deemed to be severely at risk from Brexit.10 Elsewhere,
the CoR (2018a, 2018b) undertook a territorial impact
assessment of the regional impacts of Brexit followed
by a published report that integrated all the EU-wide
evidence assessing the likely exposure of Brexit across
EU regions. However, for almost two years since the
UK’s 2016 EU Referendum there has been no regionally
based EU-wide coordinated programme of actions or
initiatives in response to Brexit, although by the summer
of 2018 EU activities in the cross-Channel port areas
have been signiﬁcantly stepped up in order to try to
cope with a hard or chaotic Brexit (BBC, 2018a,
2018b). In the late summer of 2018, both the UK gov-
ernment (UK Government, 2018) and the European
Commission (2018) started issuing policy papers regard-
ing the implications and preparations for a No Deal
scenario, but these are largely sectoral with little if any
regional dimension to them, except in the case of the
UK regarding short-term Cohesion Funding arrange-
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have been little if any real ofﬁcial guidance in any country
for regions that are especially exposed to Brexit.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF UK
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
In the post-Brexit UK context, the development of local
industrial strategies is one of the main local, urban and
regional policy initiatives. These are to be led either by city-
region mayors in the newly formed CAs or by the LEPs in
other areas. But how exactly these local strategies are to relate
to the National Industrial Strategy, and what the overall
future regional policy framework and settings are likely to
be are, as yet, unknown. This, therefore, raises the questions
as to the competence and capacity of the LEPs, CAs or
devolved administrations to deliver such policies.
Many arguments suggest that the governance capacity
of devolved administrations is reasonably high, especially
relating to local development policies. In particular, both
government experience and governance settings point to
the fact that in comparison with most other parts of the
UK, Scotland has the capacity and capability to design,
develop and deliver a wide range of policies, including
those related to local economic development, in the post-
Brexit context. Wales has a more limited capacity for
devolved governance than Scotland, partly because of
both the much weaker underlying economic base and the
fewer devolved powers. However, Wales still has far more
experience at designing, delivering and managing policies
economic development than most parts of England. Both
Scotland and Wales have enjoyed longstanding direct con-
tacts with Brussels in a manner that was not possible for
many other UK regions, and they are likely to lose almost
all these direct lines of communication after Brexit.
The situation in England is somewhat different. Before
2010, EU Cohesion Policy actions and interventions in the
arena of local, urban and regional policy were managed by
the RDAs, of which there were nine within England,
working in conjunction with the regional government
ofﬁces (McCann, 2016) as well as the three devolved
administrations. The RDAs had built up some 15 years
of experience in designing and managing local develop-
ment policies co-ﬁnanced by EU Cohesion Policy. Indeed,
working alongside both central government and Brussels,
the shared management experience the RDAs gained was
one of the few genuinely multilevel governance arrange-
ments in UK urban and regional economic policy. This
experience was almost entirely lost with the abolition of
the RDAs and their replacement with LEPs in 2010.
Since then, the experience and efﬁcacy of LEPs have
been rather varied (Pike, Marlow, McCarthy, O’Brien, &
Tomaney, 2015), to say the least, in all aspects including
their links with Brussels, so in institutional–communi-
cation terms, the immediate impact of Brexit will depend
on the strength of their existing links.
A much greater issue, however, is in terms of the ability
of local industrial strategies partially to redress the Brexit-
induced increasing interregional imbalances which are
likely. Part of the problem is that many LEPs are entirely
unsuitable for addressing, or responding to, many of the
future economic development challenges facing the UK.
Those LEPs that can play a realistic and meaningful role
in fostering local development can do so largely because
of the places in which they happen to ﬁnd themselves,
and not because of the fact that they as LEPs are the
well-designed institutions to play such a role. In particular,
those LEPs that are in city-regions which are either already
prosperous or are already coordinating well in governance
terms are likely to make some positive contributions to
local development activities. In contrast, in cases where
the local economy is weak or where local government
coordination is difﬁcult due to fragmentation or limited
capacity, many local LEPs will be largely redundant.
Indeed, the scale of the LEPs’ budgets and institutional
capacity means that these contributions will always be sec-
ondary, and in some cases entirely marginal, to the broader
city-regional governance and economic picture. In particu-
lar, the current fragmented sub-national governance set-up
does not encourage or facilitate coordination or cooperation
between economically stronger and economically weaker
places, except in a few very restrictive contexts. Indeed,
even though a delegation of the leaders of the UK’s ten
‘Core Cities’ met with Michel Barnier in early 2018,11
their ability realistically to inﬂuence the trajectory of UK–
EU negotiations, which are framed almost entirely within
a national or sectoral logic, is extremely limited.
These issues will be particularly marked in many smaller
towns and also coastal towns, and real concern has arisen
regarding the future policy provision of their needs (Jen-
nings, Lent, & Stoker, 2017). However, the likely impacts
on smaller settlements post-Brexit also differ markedly
across the country. In general, small towns tend to be rela-
tively prosperous in many parts of the South, South East
and SouthWest of England, and many of these are actually
more prosperous than even the most dynamic Northern or
Midlands cities (McCann, 2016). In contrast, in the Mid-
lands and North of England, many small towns are really
struggling, with low levels of economic development and
the widespread hollowing out of town centres (Wrigley
& Lambiri, 2015). In these types of situations, many
LEPs will be largely powerless to respond to their local
needs, even with local industrial strategies, and the removal
of discussions from the industrial strategy regarding any
new coordinating meso-level institutions means that the
situation is likely to remain largely unchanged for the fore-
seeable future because there will be no possibilities to link
these towns with the city-regions.
The economic and institutional weaknesses of many of
these localities is all the more problematic because for the
last three decades the local, urban and regional develop-
ment policy in the UK has been dominated by the logic
and architecture of EU Cohesion Policy. A major advan-
tage of EU Cohesion Policy was that it explicitly targeted
weaker regions with long-term investment commitments
that were largely independent of the politics of the UK
national government that happened to be in power at any
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one time or of the lobbying power of particular industrial
sectors. Leaving the EU not only will again domesticate
the remnants of regional policy but also, more impor-
tantly, will almost immediately re-politicize it, making
long-term development commitments by the private sec-
tor of civil society sectors all the more difﬁcult. This is
because for purely political reasons new parties in gov-
ernment will always have an incentive to abolish what
went on during previous governments. Such decisions
will often be taken without any serious or structured
thinking regarding the long-term consequences of the
decision, exactly as occurred in the case if the 2010 dis-
solution of the RDAs and the government ofﬁces for the
regions. Moreover, in a country such as the UK, with a
highly centralized and top-down governance system
with few countervailing institutions, the temptation to
act in this purely political manner is always very strong.
In the most extreme case, it will also make it easier for
central government to abolish, undermine or dissolve
regional policy entirely, if it so wishes, even under the
guise of promoting cities. Again, the fact that the 2010
government also heavily centralized regional-related pol-
icies for England at a national level, almost entirely
against the logic and spirit of place-based thinking, com-
bined with the fact that all talk of new meso-level insti-
tutions disappeared from the industrial strategy White
Paper, means that these are not unrealistic concerns.
The tendency for new governments to change policy
will make the establishment of long-term policy commit-
ments which are also attractive to both the private sector
and civil society – which are essential for any place-based
possibility of regional rebalancing – all the more difﬁcult.
The national need for institutional reform aimed at devo-
lution and local capacity-building will nearly always be
subsumed by the perceived national-control needs of
central government.
CONCLUSIONS
The great majority of available evidence suggests that
Brexit is likely to make the UK’s interregional inequalities
worse than they already are, with many Leave-voting
regions being especially vulnerable. Although recently
there have been some very tentative steps towards a more
place-based governance system, the UK’s highly centralized
and top-down governance system would seem to be
uniquely ill-equipped to deal with these eventualities.
Moreover, these inabilities are currently exacerbated by
Brexit, which is leading to both further governance centra-
lization and also the stalling of many policy arenas, includ-
ing regional economic development. Unsurprisingly, the
UK’s sub-national governance system appears to be largely
unprepared for the post-Brexit challenges, with the many
observed Brexit-related initiatives and activities being lar-
gely ad hoc and uncoordinated between localities, reﬂecting
the widespread policy paralysis evident in the UK insti-
tutional system. Moreover, the various opposing national
and sub-national governance pressures, along with the
UK’s domestic desire to diverge from EU-related systems
and structures, will make it very difﬁcult to design and
implement a serious and workable post-Brexit UK regional
development framework.
A ﬁnal issue concerns the hypothetical counterfactual
case, of whether a different sub-national governance set-
up in the UK might have permitted a more coordinated
and effective response to Brexit at the regional level, and
there are four possible responses to this point. First,
there are strong grounds for believing that a much more
devolved longstanding sub-national governance system
may well have limited the interregional inequalities evi-
dent arising within the UK (McCann, 2016), and as
such may have lessened the likelihood of a Leave vote in
the ﬁrst place. Second, international comparisons suggest
that with a more devolved sub-national UK governance
system, the weaker UK regions would in all likelihood
have been much stronger than they currently are, and
therefore they would have been more resilient to economic
shocks than is currently the case. Third, however, inter-
national comparisons of other large advanced economies
also suggest that the current level of devolution taking
place within England is primarily to areas that are simply
too small to be effective in responding to major shocks
(McCann, 2016), and serious consideration needs to be
given as to how the coordination between CAs as well
as between LEPs and CAs can be strengthened. Fourth,
it may be that much of the previously existing sub-
national governance capacity has been withered or
destroyed by years of austerity (Bailey & Budd, 2017)
and now there is the risk that devolution post-Brexit
may further undermine weaker regions unless it is much
more heavily underpinned with greater ﬁnancial and
decision-making resources from central government.
Taken together, the arguments and evidence presented
here suggest that a much more serious sub-national devo-
lution agenda – with far greater ﬁnancial and decision-
making resources which also operate at larger spatial
scales – is essential for a post-Brexit Britain on economic,
political, governance and institutional grounds.
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NOTES
1. The European Investment Bank committed €36 billion
of investment to the UK between 2011 and 2016, an
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annual funding ﬂow of some €6 billion (Ayres & O’Brien,
2018).
2. For comparison, the total combined annual invest-
ments of all the new UK city-region combined authorities
amount to no more than £300 million per annum (Pike,
Kempton, Marlow, O’Brien, & Tomaney, 2016).
3. See https://www.grimsbytelegraph.co.uk/news/grimsby-
news/brexit-exemption-sought-grimsby-seafood-736984/.
4. A search of Hansard (House of Commons Library and
Parliamentary mentions) showed that Brexit plus London
had been mentioned 1379 times, while Brexit plus Bir-





6. Which was worth some £500 million per annum




8. For a more detailed coverage of sub-national activities
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